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Abstract
Recent trade negotiations, both at the regional and multilateral level, have seen a resurgence
of the issue of trade and labour standards.  As the world economy becomes increasingly
globalised and the volume of world trade flows keeps increasing between the North and the
South, it is very likely that the interaction of labour standards and international trade will
continue to remain high on the agenda of future trade talks.  Labour interests in high-
standards countries argue that low labour standards are an unfair source of comparative
advantage, and that increasing imports from low-standards countries will have an adverse
impact on wages and working conditions in high-standards countries, thus leading to a race to
the bottom of standards.  For low-standards countries, there is the fear that this is just a form
of disguised protectionism and that the imposition of high labour standards upon them is
equally unfair since it will erode their competitiveness, the latter being largely based on
labour costs.  Our objective in the present paper is to cast some light on the above debate from
both a theoretical and empirical perspective.  In particular, we first discuss some possible
theoretical links between labour standards and comparative advantage through their effects on
the terms of trade.  We then investigate empirically the effects of labour standards on export
performance and foreign direct investment flows.  Overall, our empirical results suggest that
caution should be exercised before drawing broad conclusions on the magnitude and direction
of these effects.  We conclude by presenting policy implications of our analysis.
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Trade and Labour Standards:
Theory, New Empirical Evidence, and Policy Implications
1 Introduction
The issue of trade and labour standards has been at the forefront of both regional
and multilateral trade negotiations over the past two decades, and will likely remain high
on the agenda of future trade talks as North-South trade flows continue to increase.  When
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was being negotiated in the 1990s,
concerns were raised that low labour standards in Mexico could pose a threat to U.S.
firms, leaving the latter at a comparative disadvantage and forcing them to close down or
relocate production.  Both the United States and France have also attempted (without
much success) to introduce the issue of labour standards during the Uruguay Round; the
United States has gone a step further by including a worker rights clause into many of its
trade agreements, thus denying special trading benefits to countries who fail to comply
with the U.S. definition of workers’ rights.  
Labour standards can be defined as a set of worker rights provided and enforced
by national governments of different countries, the levels of which are both a reflection of
these countries’ preferences and the extent to which they comply with international
conventions (from the International Labour Organization, henceforth ILO) which they
have signed.  The level of labour standards chosen by a particular country is ultimately a
function of that country’s level of economic development, and is therefore a domestic
policy choice (Alam, 1992), which means that one should expect diversity in labour
standards as the norm.  The argument from trade theorists, who believe that gains from
trade stem from diversity instead of uniformity, is that improvements in labour standards3
can be brought about with free and unrestricted trade, which tends to lead to higher rates
of growth, or by creating a greater consensus on a set of international labour standards
which all countries should abide by. 
The reason why this issue of trade and labour standards is so much debated in
trade negotiations and policy discussions is essentially as follows.  Labour interests in
high-standards countries argue that low labour standards are an unfair source of
comparative advantage, and that increasing imports from low-standards countries will
have an adverse impact on wages and working conditions in high-standards countries, thus
leading to a race to the bottom of standards.  For low-standards countries, there is the fear
that the imposition of high labour standards upon them is just a form of disguised
protectionism and is equally unfair since it will erode their competitiveness, which is
largely based on labour costs.  The present paper is a contribution to the above debate
from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.  
Theoretically, it establishes the conditions under which and the reasons why
countries might opt for a given level of labour standards that go beyond just the concern
for human rights.  At the empirical level, the paper investigates the effects of labour
standards on export performance and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.  If the
popular views on the issue of trade and labour standards are correct, one should expect
low-standards countries to enjoy a better export performance and attract more FDI than
high-standards countries, ceteris paribus.  We present both time series and cross sectional
estimates, and our empirical results imply that the choice of proper indicators for labour
standards is extremely important in order to carry out any meaningful empirical exercise.
They also suggest that caution should be exercised before drawing broad conclusions on4
the magnitude and direction of labour standards on export performance and FDI flows.
This paper, therefore, reports on research that is part of an ongoing research project of the
authors.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 establishes some theoretical links
between labour standards and comparative advantage through their effects on the terms of
trade.  In sections 3 and 4, we present some new empirical evidence regarding the effects
of labour standards on export performance and FDI flows, using both cross-sectional and
time series data.  Section 5 concludes with some policy implications of our analysis.
2 Theory
Theoretical work linking international trade with labour standards is relatively
scarce.  The classic early studies, for instance by Johnson (1969) and Brecher (1974a and
1974b), considered minimum wages and their welfare implications but did not consider
other internationally accepted labour standards such as the number of hours worked, the
freedom from forced labour or unionization.  On the other hand, Alam (1992), in an
unpublished doctoral dissertation, was one of the first to provide a more general
framework for the economic analysis of the impact of labour standards, at constant goods
prices, on a country’s comparative advantage within the framework of a two-country, two-
commodity, two-factor model.  Brown et al. (1996) focused on the welfare and other
effects of standards and whether it is in a country’s interest to implement common
international standards.  They use general equilibrium analysis by considering different
variants of the standard two-good two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model in order
to analyse the effects of standards on the terms of trade.  The different models in Brown et
al. show that the effects of labour standards are dependent on the technology of5
production of goods and standards, and also on whether the standards are endogenous.
Some of these results are anticipated as well in unpublished work by Dehejia and Garbo
(1994).
We should mention as well that, while the mechanism through which we model
the standard is the usual way it is done in the trade-theoretic literature, there are other
alternatives. For instance, Sinn (2003), in his forthcoming Jahnsson lectures, builds a
dynamic model in which the standard directly raises labour costs and is perceived as a
non-pecuniary “wage” by workers, and uses this to demonstrate a natural tendency
towards convergence between high- and low-standard countries as the latter catch up with
the former through capital accumulation and growth.
2.1 The Model and Results
We use a standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model to examine the effects of
imposing labour standards in a country.  Two countries (I and II) produce two traded
goods (X and Y) and each good uses two factors of production, labour (L) and capital (K).
Perfect competition is assumed to prevail in commodity markets and in factor markets.
Technology and preferences are identical in both countries and are assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas in this model.  Labour and capital are available in fixed amounts in each country;
each factor of production is perfectly mobile within the country but cannot be sent abroad.
The two countries engage in trade and goods can be exported or imported at zero transport
costs. As a result, differences in relative overall endowments drive comparative advantage
in such a model.  6
In equilibrium, the terms of trade p (= py/px) must be such as to clear the market
for each good.  In other words, world production must be equal to world consumption or
the value of exports of a country must be equal to the value of its imports.  By Walras’s
law, clearance of the market for good X implies clearance of the other and we are thus
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where C’s denote the consumption of goods X and Y, Q’s refer to production levels and
the superscripts refer to countries I and II.  As mentioned above, technology is taken to be
Cobb-Douglas, so that production of goods X and Y in countries I and II respectively can
be represented as follows:
θ θ− =
1
x x x L K Q         (2)
µ µ− =
1
y y y L K Q         (3)
Consumption levels for goods X and Y are obtained by maximizing a Cobb-Douglas
community utility function subject to a budget constraint.  This results in the following
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where w and r are the wage rate and rental rate respectively and where superscripts refer
to countries.  α and β are the preference parameters associated with the community utility7
function and α + β = 1 and 0 < α, β < 1.  Substituting equations (2)-(5) in equation (1)
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, and where C = µ + αθ – αµ and D = θ + βµ– βθ.  Since α + β = 1, then C = D, which






























p       (6a)
Equation (6a) implies that one can express the terms of trade in terms of overall
endowments, and technological and preference parameters.  
Terms of Trade with a Labour Standard
We now want to look at the impact on the terms of trade of imposing a labour
standard in one of the two countries.  In a small country case, the change in trade due to
the imposition of a labour standard would likely have no effect on world prices.  In the
present case, we assume that countries I and II are sufficiently large to influence their
terms of trade and we consider two different ways in which the labour standard might alter
the terms of trade.  
Case 1:
Suppose the labour standard is imposed in country I only, and withdraws resources (both
capital and labour) from one of the tradeable sectors (for instance sector X).  We do not
explicitly model how the labour standard will be produced but only assume that its effect
is to lead to a reduction in output in the sector where it is imposed by using some amount8
of capital and labour.  As a result of the labour standard being imposed, a smaller amount
of good X will be produced such that  
θ θ− − =
1 ) 1 ( x x x L K A Q  and 0 < A < 1.         (7)
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Substituting equation (7) and equations (3)-(5) in equation (8) and simplifying yields the
following expression for the terms of trade:
) 1 (





























        (9)
Equation (9) is in fact equation (6) multiplied by (1-A), and it implies that the terms of
trade fall when the labour standard is imposed in sector X, which is the export industry
(since dp/dA < 0).  One should note, however, that the preference parameters associated
with the community utility function will likely be of different magnitudes in the presence
of the labour standard since the consumer will also derive utility from the labour standard
in addition to the traded goods.  On the other hand, if the labour standard is imposed in
sector Y, and because world production is always equal to world consumption for each
good, I can re-write equation (1) in terms of good Y for country I and good X for country
II.  In this case, the terms of trade will be equal to 
) 1 (
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Equation (10) is equation (6) divided by (1-A) and it implies that the country will now
experience an improvement in its terms of trade when the labour standard is imposed in9
the import sector.  To summarize, therefore, a labour standard, modelled as above, will
lead to an improvement or deterioration in the terms of trade depending on whether it is
imposed in the import or export sector.  
Case 2:
Suppose now that the same amount of tradeable goods (X and Y) is produced as in the case
where there was no standard but that a fraction (A) of output X is then used to finance the
labour standard.  In other words, only (1-A) of output X is available for trade
1.  The fact
that the labour standard is using some of the output of X implicitly implies that it is once
again using some amount of capital and some amount of labour.  This gives rise to the
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and where C = µ + αθ – αµ and D = θ + βµ– βθ.  The wage/rental ratio and the factor
intensities for goods X and Y are also all dependent on the terms of trade, which is now
dependent on A.  Hence, once the value of A is determined, and given overall endowments
in both countries as well as technological and preference parameters, the terms of trade,
the wage-rental ratio and the capital-labour ratios of goods X and Y are all determined in
this model.  A change in A will therefore have an impact on the terms of trade, factor
                                                          
1 This is equivalent to saying that the labor standard uses the same technology as sector X.  Even though this
assumption is restrictive, it allows one to focus on the terms of trade effect.  Introducing a different
capital/labor ratio for the standard would add one more dimension to the model and bring one closer to a
Komiya-type model where the tradeables and non-traded good have different capital intensities.  Dehejia10



























θ θ µ θ
µ µ
θ θ ) 1 (
) (
) 1 (
) 1 ( 1
1
1
      (12)
If we assume that incomplete specialization obtains, then ky > k
I, that is, the
capital-labour ratio of good Y is greater than that of the economy, making the element in
square brackets positive.  The sign of equation (12) will thus depend on (θ-µ), which is the
difference between the capital-labour ratios of goods X and Y.  Hence movement of the
terms of trade due to a change in A depends on the capital-labour intensity of the
tradeables.  For example, if good X was the capital-intensive good and country I was
capital abundant such that good X was being exported, then θ > µ which means that dp/dA
> 0, and there would thus be a terms of trade gain when the labour standard is imposed in
the export sector.  
Even though we have only considered models where the labour standard is
imposed by one country at a time in order to identify the terms of trade effects, it is quite
possible that countries which trade with one another will each set their domestic labour
standards at a certain level.  For example, one could again use equation (1) to consider the
effects of a labour standard in sector X of country I and sector Y of country II and it is easy
to see that the effects will not only depend on which sector the standard is imposed but
also on the relative levels of the standard in each country.  An important implication of the
results obtained above is that countries will tend to impose labour standards in order to
sway the terms of trade in their favour.  For instance, a country might choose to set a
                                                                                                                                                                             
and Garbo (1994) also consider such a case and the resulting implications for the terms of trade in a
different type of setting.11
labour standard in the import sector and thus obtain terms of trade gains; or alternatively,
it could try to force its trading partner to adopt a labour standard in the latter’s export
sector, which would lead to a deterioration in its trading partner’s terms of trade and hence
improve its own.  
The other implication of the above analysis is that countries will also have an
incentive to set labour standards that are too high or too low and just for terms of trade
gains, and that the absence of coordination will not allow them to reach the world
optimum
2.  In other words, because of the potential terms of trade gains, countries acting
rationally from an individual point of view will not maximize global welfare.  The results
obtained thus far have shown that the imposition of a standard reduces production, the
volume of trade and can also lead to an improvement or deterioration in the terms of trade.
From the point of view of national welfare, the overall effect of standards will depend on
the benefit that consumers derive from consuming the standard good and the loss in
welfare due to reduced consumption of the traded goods, as well as the terms of trade
effects of the standard on product and factor prices, which were considered in the previous
section.  Hence, even though standards may be distortionary, they may improve national
welfare by providing benefits that are valued highly by consumers.     
For example, suppose that there are N consumers indexed by i = 1,…,N in country
I.  In the absence of any labour standard, consumers will derive utility from the
consumption of goods X and Y.  With a labour standard, each representative consumer has
identical preferences and derives utility from 
γ β α
i i i i z y x U =       (13)12
where α + β + γ = 1 and where z represents the labour standard.  This utility function
implies that an individual’s utility depends not only on the consumption of the two
tradeables but also on the labour standard.  Each individual possesses some amount of
capital and some amount of labour such that individual i’s income is given by Ii = wLi +
rKi, where Li  (Ki)  denotes  labour (capital) owned by individual i. Also,
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11 , which are the overall endowments of labour and capital.
At the economy level, for country I, we can think of the labour standard as a non-traded
good such that supply equals demand.  It is assumed that the demand for the standard is
proportional to national income, the factor of proportionality being equal to γ.  Individual
i’s demand for the standard will correspondingly be equal to γIi.  Preferences of
individual i can also be described by an indirect utility function Vi = Vi(p,Ii) , where Vi
represents the maximum utility obtained by individual i, given p (= py / px , and taking
good X as the numeraire) and Ii, as follows:
β
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Suppose we assume that Li and Ki are exogenous to individual i.  Suppose also that the
individual recognizes the effects of the labour standard on producer and factor prices.
Based on these assumptions, we can substitute the expressions for p, w and r obtained
previously while deriving the terms of trade, in Vi(p,Ii)   to obtain the following:
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where,
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Brown et al also obtain this result in the case of a specialized economy. However, as Dehejia (1998) has
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Rewriting i’s utility function in terms of the indirect utility function thus enables one to
interpret the latter as i’s welfare as a function of A:
) ( ) ( ) (
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This welfare function is dependent upon the individual’s income, the terms of trade and by
construction the labour standard.  Equation (16) tells us that as long as the marginal
benefit from consuming the standard (represented by parameter γ ) exceeds the possible
welfare losses (either through reduced consumption of the tradeables or because of
adverse changes in the terms of trade and their effects on factor prices), then there will be
an incentive for the consumer to demand the labour standard.  For the economy as a
whole, the indirect utility function and the social welfare function will be respectively 
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which are the same as equations (14) and (16) except that the individual factor
endowments are replaced by the country factor endowments.  Once again, national
welfare will depend on the consumption of tradeable goods and the labour standard and as
long as the sum of marginal benefits derived from consuming the standard is high enough,
national welfare will be higher.14
Now that possible links between labour standards, comparative advantage and
trade have been established, we empirically examine the issue of trade and labour
standards in the next two sections of this paper by considering the effects of labour
standards on foreign direct investment flows and export performance.    
3 New Empirical Evidence – Cross Sectional Analysis
Using cross-sectional data and considering both developed and developing
countries, we consider two questions related to the issue of trade and labour standards.
First, whether the imposition of labour standards affects the export performance of
countries; second, whether labour standards affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.
We make use of several indicators for labour standards to answer these two important
questions, namely the ratification of ILO conventions, the number of hours worked, the
number of days of paid annual leave or the degree of unionisation.  
Existing empirical work on the issue of trade and labour standards is also rather
scarce.  An OECD (1996) study tried to establish possible links between core labour
standards, trade, foreign direct investment, economic development and employment.  The
actual effects of core labour standards (measured by freedom of association rights) on
output were found to be negligible compared with other factors such as technological
shifts, prices of raw materials and the terms of trade.  As far as trade performance is
concerned, the study found no evidence that countries with low labour standards achieved
a better export performance than countries with high labour standards.  Regarding FDI
flows, a review of the evidence showed that core labour standards were not important
determinants of investors’ decisions.  All the above results, according to the OECD, lead15
to the conclusion that the concerns of developing countries that core standards will
adversely influence their international competitiveness is unfounded.  
Mah (1997) analysed the relationship between core labour standards and the export
performance of developing countries.  More specifically, he considered the ratification of
ILO conventions related to core labour standards for forty-five developing countries as an
independent variable to analyse their export performance for 1993.  Unlike the OECD
(1996) study, which based itself on just plots, his regression results showed that
ratification of the conventions related to freedom of association, collective bargaining, and
non-discrimination lead to a deterioration of export performance.  Similar results are
obtained even when a capital cost element is added as an additional explanatory variable.
Mah’s results thus contradict the OECD findings that there is no relationship between
export performance and the level of labour standards.
Rodrik (1996) used a variety of measures of labour standards (number of ILO
conventions ratified, democracy index that represents civil and political rights, indicator
for child labour, statutory hours of work in manufacturing, days of annual leave in
manufacturing, and percentage of the labour force that is unionised) to analyse their
effects on (i) labour costs (ii) comparative advantage and hence trade flows, and (iii) FDI.
His results show that labour standards are significant determinants of labour costs when
one controls for productivity; but they are not important determinants of comparative
advantage, the latter being determined mostly by factor endowments.  Regarding the
effect of labour standards on FDI flows, by controlling for policy distortions, population
and the growth rate, he finds that his indicators for democracy and child labour are
significant and that low labour standards are in fact a deterrent for foreign investors.  His16
results also indicate that ratification of conventions, both with regards to core labour
standards and other labour standards, are not significant determinants of FDI.
3.1 Data
In order to estimate the relationship between 1) export performance and labour
standards and 2) FDI and labour standards, cross-sectional macro-data are used for a
sample of countries that consists of both developed and developing (OECD) countries.
For the purposes of this paper, the sample of countries examined is taken from the OECD
(1996) study and for which reliable data are available.
3  The latest available data is
gathered regarding indicators of labour standards, and these are explained below.
We obtain data concerning the ratification of core ILO conventions from ILOLEX,
which is a database of international labour standards from the ILO.  The total number of
ILO conventions (tconv) ratified is obtained from the World Labour Report (1995), and it
varies widely across countries.  For instance, France, Italy and Spain have each ratified
over one hundred conventions, whereas Korea and Botswana have ratified only four and
two conventions respectively. 
We consider an indicator of civil liberties obtained from Freedom House (1995),
which is an annual survey of political rights and civil liberties and denote this variable as
civilb.  The checklist for civil liberties includes questions on the presence of trade unions,
the effectiveness of collective bargaining, and freedom from exploitation by employers or
union leaders.  It is measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with smaller values indicating more
rights.  Rodrik (1996) uses a formula that combines the civil liberties index and the
political rights index to arrive at an index of labour standards.  In fact, his “democracy”17
index is obtained from the following transformation: (14-(civilb + pright))/12, where
pright stands for political rights. In the present paper, only the civil liberties index is used
because it is our view that the political rights checklist includes questions that are related
to human rights that go beyond just labour standards.
4
We consider the normal weekly hours of work as per the labour regulations that
are in effect in each country and denote this variable as hour.  Some countries report the
range of hours (for example, 44 to 48 per week according to industry) and in that case the
minimum is chosen.  The number of days of paid annual leave allowed in each country in
accordance with domestic laws is also considered and this variable is denoted as leave.
The number of days of annual leave normally increases with the number of years in
service.  To be consistent, the minimum is always picked.  
We consider union membership as a percentage of the non-agricultural labour
force for 1995.  For some countries, due to a lack of data, trade union density for the years
1993 and 1994 are taken.  We denote this variable as union.  Finally, variable injuries,
which indicates occupational injuries per thousand people employed, is considered.  This
variable can be interpreted as an indicator of safety at the workplace.
3.2 Models Estimated and Empirical Results
3.2.1 Labour Standards and Export Performance 
The following model from Mah (1997) is used to assess the impact of ratifying core
labour standards on the export performance:
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 Please refer to the appendix for a list of countries examined and for data sources.
4 This is a point also raised by Alessandro Cigno.18
log (exp/gdp)i =   α0 +α1 labstdi + εI                                                                               (19)
where, 
exp is the export value in US dollars in 1995; 
gdp is gross domestic product in US dollars in 1995; 
labstd is any one of the indicators for labour standards; and ε is the disturbance term.  
A second model from Mah (1997), which includes the capital cost effect on the
export performance, is also considered:
 log(exp/gdp)i = β0 + β1 rinti + β2 labstdi + εi                               (20)
where, rint is defined as the lending rate minus the rate of inflation and the other terms are
as indicated above in equation (19).  Equation (20) is just equation (19) augmented by the
capital cost variable rint.  Equations (19) and (20) are in fact an application of the perfect
and imperfect substitutes model, which have been used to model the behaviour of exports
and imports. The perfect substitutes model assumes that homogeneous goods such as
wheat or sugar are traded on international markets at a common price, while the imperfect
substitutes model is more suitable for differentiated products.  In the perfect substitutes
model, a country’s export volume depends on domestic prices, money income, and factor
costs within the country.  The interaction of world demand and world supply in the perfect
substitutes model determines a unique world price, which is equal to the import, export
and domestic prices of traded goods (abstracting from transport costs and other trade
barriers).  
In the imperfect substitutes model, on the other hand, prices have to adjust in each
time period to maintain the equality between demand and supply.  Furthermore, there exist
costs to changing prices in imperfect markets, and variable rint in equation (20) captures19
these additional costs of adjustment.
5  Both equations (19) and (20) assume that the export
performance of a country is determined by its price competitiveness.  The effect of
imposing a labour standard can therefore be viewed as an increase in the labour cost,
which in turn results in a deterioration of the price competitiveness of a country.  
In order to interpret the results obtained from estimating equations (19) and (20),
the null hypothesis is that the coefficients (α1 and β2) of labstdi are zero, hence implying
that the export performance of the countries under study is not influenced by the
ratification of labour standards.  The alternative hypothesis in Mah’s (1997) study is that
ratification of labour standards erodes the price competitiveness of exports significantly
such that the signs of the coefficients (α1 and β2) of labstdi are negative.  Also, β1 is
expected to have a negative sign because an increase in the real interest rate can raise the
capital cost and hence lead to a deterioration of price competitiveness.  For the purposes
of the present paper, it is assumed that the alternative hypothesis is that the signs of α1 and
β2 are different from zero such that a two-tail test is considered for the significance of the
labour standard.  Indeed, it is quite possible that some labour standards can improve the
production process, stimulate workers, and hence enhance productivity.  The OECD
(1996) study, for example, considers this possibility.  The overall effect on efficiency and
export performance may therefore not be as clear as one would expect.   
We first replicate Mah’s empirical analysis but using 1995 data for exports and
gross domestic product, and core ILO conventions ratified as of the end of 1995 as our
labour standard.  The year 1995 is chosen because this is the year for which the latest data
are available for other indicators of labour standards, such as degree of unionization and
                                                          
5 The perfect and imperfect substitutes models are more explicitly presented in Goldstein and Khan (1985).20
total ILO conventions ratified. This allows us to test the robustness of Mah’s results,
especially when the conventions ratified are considered in isolation as carried out by Mah
but also when they are included all at the same time in equations (19) and (20).  We also
check whether the choice of different (and more realistic) indicators for labour standards
yields different conclusions.   Whereas Mah’s analysis focuses on core labour standards
for developing countries only, we also consider all the conventions that have been ratified
with respect to labour standards (denoted as variable tconv) and carry our analysis for
developing countries and a broader sample that includes developed countries.  The method
of estimation for the various equations is ordinary least squares.  Because we are dealing
with cross-sectional data and a sample of heterogeneous countries, heteroskedasticity is a
possibility and therefore White’s test is applied to correct for it whenever necessary.  The
results are as follows.   
In the case of developing countries (results not included), for both equations (19)
and (20), when ILO core conventions are used as indicators for labour standards and are
considered individually, only the conventions related to forced labour are not significant.
This is indeed not a surprise since forced labour is quasi non-existent in most countries.
There is strong evidence in support of the view that ratification of the other conventions
has a negative effect on export performance.  tconv, which goes beyond just core labour
standards, is also significant for the sample of developing countries.  Once developed
countries are included in the sample of countries, the labour standards variables lose some
of their significance.  One possible explanation for this might be because richer countries
tend to produce more capital-intensive goods such that labour is not as important a factor
as in developing countries.  21
When all the core ILO conventions ratified are included at the same time, they
have a less significant effect on export performance (results not included).  With regards
to developing countries, the results for equation (19) show that only the conventions
related to the right to organize and non-discrimination are significant.  It is also not clear
whether labour standards are more significant for developing countries than for developed
countries as observed previously.  The main conclusion that we can draw from this
analysis is that Mah’s results are not very robust to the specification used.  
The next two tables show the results which are obtained when equations (19) and
(20) are re-estimated using different indicators of labour standards other than conventions
ratified.  The variables that are considered are civilb, hour, leave, union and injuries, and,
in effect, we are replacing labstd in equations (19) and (20) by the latter variables.  It is
our view that ILO Conventions ratified are not realistic indicators for labour standards
since countries sign them while at the same time knowing that they are not binding.  The
index for civil liberties and the degree of unionization are obtained from actual surveys
and as such are more realistic indicators of labour standards.  Furthermore, hour and leave
are guaranteed by domestic laws and are more likely to be enforced than the ratification of
conventions from the ILO.  22
Table 1: Estimated coefficients for equation (19)– Developing Countries
Explanatory
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 4.84** 4.60 5.82* -0.33 -0.58** -0.68**
(2.12) (2.01) (1.81) (0.93) (-3.43) (-2.32)
civilb 0.03 0.02
(0.91) (0.40)
log(hour) -1.30** -1.21* -1.44*
(-2.14) (-2.00) (-1.72)
log(leave) -0.26** -0.24** -0.36** -0.38**






2 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.28
N 39 39 28 28 18 18
F-Stat (p-value) 3.52 (0.02) 4.45 (0.01) 3.94 (0.02) 4.11 (0.03) 2.92 (0.09) 1.89 (0.18)
White Test (p-value) 0.92 (0.52) 1.49 (0.22) 1.08 (0.42) 0.42 (0.83) 0.68 (0.52) 1.19 (0.37)
Note:  Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values.  *(**) indicates 10(5)
percent level of significance.
Columns (1) to (6) of Table 1 show some of the results when different
combinations of labour standards are tried as explanatory variables.  This procedure is a
departure from Mah’s (1997) methodology, which consists of introducing one indicator at
a time to isolate the individual effects.  It turns out that the significance of the variables in
Tables 1 and 2 is not much altered when this change is implemented and that our results
are therefore more robust to changes in specification.  On the other hand, when the same23
procedure was applied to conventions ratified, the significance of the variables changed
considerably.  
As shown in Table 1 above, when equation (19) is estimated using these more
realistic indicators for labour standards, the civil liberties index variable, the unionization
variable and the variable related to occupational injuries are all insignificant.  The
coefficients for hours worked and paid annual leave are, however, both negative and
significant.  This shows that longer hours of work (more demanding working conditions)
are associated with a deterioration of export performance, whereas better conditions of
work (in terms of more paid annual leave granted) also lead to a deterioration of export
performance.  Hence, it is not clear whether better working conditions will lead to an
improvement in export performance, or put another way, whether countries that tend to be
characterized by lower labour standards do in fact have a competitive advantage in trade.  
Table 2 shows the results when equation (20) is estimated using indicators other
than conventions ratified.  The results are quite similar to the ones obtained in Table 1, as
only hour and leave are significant.  The capital cost coefficient is of the expected sign but
is not statistically significant.  Once again, it is not clear whether export performance
improves or deteriorates with higher labour standards since longer hours of work and
more days of annual leave seem to both be a deterrent to export performance24
Table 2: Estimated coefficients for equation (20)– Developing Countries
Explanatory
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 4.92** 4.75** 5.79* 0.30 -0.57* -0.66*
(2.13) (2.07) (1.77) (0.83) (-3.28) (-1.77)
rint -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.70) (-0.89) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.70) (-0.55)
civilb 0.02 0.02
(0.71) (0.28)
log(hour) -1.32** -1.26** -1.44*
(-2.16) (-2.08) (-1.69)
log(leave) -0.23** -0.22** -0.35** -0.36**






2 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.25 0.04 0.05
N 39 39 28 28 19 19
F-Stat (p-value) 2.87 (0.03) 3.51 (0.02) 2.91 (0.04) 2.72 (0.07) 1.82 (0.20) 1.32 (0.32)
White Test (p-value) 0.98 (0.50) 0.92 (0.52) 1.46 (0.25) 0.42 (0.91) 0.97 (0.48) 0.55 (0.80)
Note:  Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values.  *(**) indicates 10(5)
percent level of significance.
When developed countries are included in the regressions of Tables 1 and 2
(results not shown), with the exception of the union variable, the other indicators for
labour standards tend to become less significant.  When developed countries are
considered separately and the equations are re-estimated, the union variable is in fact very25
highly significant.  While this result might be an indication that the degree of unionization
matters more for the export performance of developed countries than that of developing
countries, it could also be due to an identification problem. Our results seem to indicate
that labour standards exert a greater influence on the export performance of developing
countries rather than developed countries.
3.2.2 Labour Standards and Foreign Direct Investment
An important feature of the world economy in the past two decades has been the
phenomenal increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), or investment by transnational
corporations or multinational enterprises in foreign countries.  Since the early 1980s,
world FDI flows have increased more rapidly than world trade or world output according
to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Equally striking is the fact that the
developing countries’ share in FDI inflows is also increasing, which means that the world
market for FDI is becoming more competitive.  Various competing explanations for the
determinants of FDI can be found in the literature and while most of them have received
some empirical support, it has been impossible to find enough favourable evidence on any
one of them to discount all the others (see for example, De Jong and Vos (1994), Dunning
(1977), Hymer (1976) and Lizondo (1990)).  
We take a new stance by considering the influence of labour standards on FDI
inflows across countries, and we consider FDI inflows for 1996 for the sample of
countries taken from the OECD (1996) study and for which data is available.  The
decision to invest abroad in a particular country by any enterprise is motivated by the
expectations of higher profits when ranked alongside alternative investment opportunities
(at home or other countries). Hence, the two explanatory variables included in the26
benchmark regressions are the gross national product (an indicator of market size) and the
growth rate of gross domestic product (an indicator of future development potential).
These two factors are found in many empirical studies related to FDI that tend to focus on
economic factors.  The model that we posit is essentially one that considers internal
economic conditions in the host country as being important determinants of FDI.  The
equation that will be estimated is as follows:
log (FDI)t = α0 + α1 log (gnp)t-1 + α2 growtht-1 + α3 labstd t-1 + εt                            (21)
where gnp refers to gross national product, growth refers to the growth rate of real gross
domestic product, labstd is an indicator for labour standards (all included with a lag to be
consistent with other studies) and ε is the disturbance term.  It is expected that the
estimated coefficients α1 and α2 in the above equation will be positive.  A higher gross
national product and a high rate of growth are signs that an economy is doing well and
that the future looks promising.  Both are likely to have a positive influence on FDI.  
As far as labour standards are concerned, the popular view suggests that FDI tends
to flow to countries that are characterized by low labour standards.  Hence, we want to
check the hypothesis that low labour standards are attractive to foreign investors.  The
ordinary least squares estimates for a sample of non-OECD countries are reported in Table
3 below.  The benchmark regression with the gross national product and the growth rate as
explanatory variables is shown in the first column.  The other columns show the results
when different combinations of labour standards are tried.  As expected, the sign of the
coefficient for gnp is positive and is highly significant in regressions (1) to (6).  On the
other hand, the growth rate is not a very important factor that accounts for FDI inflows. 27
The labour standard variables are all insignificant and the signs of the coefficients
associated with civilb and union are contrary to the hypothesis that low labour standards
are attractive to foreign investors.  The coefficient on civilb in regression (3) is negative
(that is, as civilb decreases, FDI increases) and this implies that high labour standards are
attracting more FDI.  The union variable has a positive coefficient (even though
statistically insignificant) implying that a higher degree of unionization (better working
conditions) attracts more FDI and this again contradicts the general belief on the
relationship between FDI and labour standards.  Equation (21) is also estimated for a
sample that includes developed countries only (results not reported here).  Overall, the
results obtained are mixed.  For instance, in the case of regression (4), the coefficients for
gnp and growth are significant at 5% and 10% respectively, the coefficient on civilb is
negative and significant at 10% for regression (4) and this implies that high labour
standards are attracting more FDI.  On the other hand, the union variable has a negative
coefficient and is also significant at 10%, implying that a higher degree of unionization
(better working conditions) attracts less FDI.  In sum, the above results reveal that there is
no robust evidence that countries with low labour standards are attracting more FDI than
those with high labour standards.28
Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment - Developing countries, 1996
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -5.12** -5.39** 5.63 -4.76** -4.41* -4.41*
(-5.45) (-3.77) (0.51) (-3.00) (-1.87) (-1.83)
log(gnp) 1.09** 1.11** 1.08** 1.03** 1.00** 0.95**
(10.88) (8.12) (9.29) (6.79) (3.16) (3.13)
Growth 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06
















2 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.66 0.66

























Note:  Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values.  *(**) indicates 10(5)
percent level of significance.29
4 New Empirical Evidence – Time Series Analysis 
In this section, we consider the empirical effects of different measures of labour
standards on the behaviour of exports for Canada using annual data for the period 1950
to1998.
6  We use the perfect and imperfect substitutes models outlined in the previous
section but in a time series framework.  However, as far as indicators for labour standards
are concerned, we do not consider conventions ratified at all when we examine the
stationarity properties of the different time series for Canada since they are not continuous
variables.  Unlike the general approach in the literature, which is based on cross-sectional
analysis, we therefore use a time series approach.  This approach is useful since we
consider long-term time series data, which means that there is always the possibility that a
structural change (an exogenous shock) could have occurred.  In the case of the United
States (see Rodriguez and Samy (2001)), this approach allows the identification of breaks
in the data so that one is able to consider the effects of labour standards under different
regimes.  In our future research on this subject, we are planning to extend our analysis to a
full-fledged panel data approach, which would allow for the richness of both time series
and cross-sectional variation in the data.  For now, given data considerations, we consider
the two approaches separately.
In the case of Canada, the ADF tests presented evidence of non-stationarity and
except for the variable related to occupational injuries, the others were difference
stationary.    We therefore estimate a vector autoregressive model and we also provide
estimates for the error correction model.  Results for the estimation of a VAR(1) for
Canada are presented in Table 4 below and the lag was chosen using the AIC criterion. 
                                                          
6 For results pertaining to the United States, please refer to Rodriguez and Samy (2001).30
Table 4: Estimated coefficients for equation (19), Canada, 1950-1998: VAR(1)
Explanatory
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.01 -0.04 0.05** 0.01* 0.01 0.05**
(-0.86) (-1.51) (2.52) (1.72) (1.07) (2.42)
∆log(exp/gdp)t(-1) 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.30** 0.20














2 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.11 0.32
N 46 46 46 46 46 46
AIC -4.53 -3.05 -9.60 -11.12 -1.83 -13.34
SIC -4.30 -2.81 -9.28 -10.88 -1.59 -12.38
Note:  Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values.  *(**) indicates 10(5)
percent level of significance.
When the variable injt is included in the regressions, a dummy (dtc) for a break in
the intercept is considered.  Overall, the results indicate that injt and ∆lhourt are
significant while the rate of unionization is not a significant factor.  Total ILO
Conventions ratified (tconvt) is also significant at the 10% level.  However, the signs of31
tconvt and injt indicate that higher labour standards have led to an improvement in export
performance.  In the case of ∆lhourt, higher labour standards have had the opposite effect
on export performance.  Hence, only the latter labour standard is consistent with the view
that low labour standards provide a competitive advantage in trade and lead to an
improvement in export performance in the case of Canada.
Table 5: Cointegration and error correction model, equation (20), Canada:
Cointegrating Equation
log(exp/gdp)t(-1) injt(-1) lhourt(-1) uniont(-1) Constant
1.00 -6.41 16.26* 0.07 -60.67
(-1.41) (1.87) (1.45)
Error Correction Model for ∆log(exp/gdp)
Error Correction Term: -0.03* (-1.68) 
∆log(exp/gdp)t(-1) injt(-1) ∆lhourt(-1) ∆uniont(-1) Constant
0.33** -0.39** 1.31** 0.01 0.01




Note:  Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values.  *(**) indicates 10(5)
percent level of significance.
Finally, the set of VAR(1) estimates can be improved using the cointegration
framework.  In fact, given the results of the stationarity analysis, cointegration is a
possibility among the set of variables considered.  Using the Johansen test, we find
evidence (at 5% level of significance) in favour of one cointegrating vector.  The results
are presented in Table 5 above.  The top panel of the table shows the estimate of the
cointegration relation.  The bottom panel shows the estimate for the error correction for
the dependent variable.  The coefficient associated to the long-term equation is significant
with the correct sign.  In this specification, all the explanatory variables are significant32
except the variable ∆uniont(-1).  Past export performance is a significant factor in
explaining present export performance.  As far as the signs of the labour standards
variables are concerned, only ∆lhourt is consistent with the view that low labour standards
lead to higher export performance.  The rate of injuries has the opposite effect.  
5  Policy Implications 
In this paper we have considered what theory and empirics has to say on the
question of the effect of labour standards on international trade.  Contrary to the popular
notions that animate much of the distrust of the global trading system amongst certain
segments of the NGO community, there is no clearcut link, either in theory or practice,
between the level of stringency of labour standards and a country’s “competitiveness”,
whether measured by its terms of trade (in the theoretical model) or the extent to which it
attracts FDI (in the empirical work).
7 Standards are, of course, important and may affect
trade and investment flows as documented in our research, but there is, in general, no
basis for the fear that increased trade or FDI flows amongst countries of different
standards levels will induce a “race to the bottom” in which all are left worse off.
8  To see
that this is not a straw man that we have created, consider the slogan of the Canadian Auto
Workers (CAW) at their recent meeting when deciding strategy on negotiating with the
US auto makers: “No rules. No borders. No jobs”: the clear implication being that
unrestricted trade between Canada and the US would put pressure on Canadian labour
markets and/or standards. It may be a useful notion for labour unions to put forward when
negotiating, but it is not, in general, supported by the evidence.
                                                          
7 Our “benign” conclusions are also echoed in recent work on the related issue of child labour, Cigno,
Rosati, and Guarcello (2002).33
Our research points to the need for great caution when making policy
pronouncements on the linkages between trade and labour standards.  But we do not wish
to end on a pessimistic note, by rather by reiterating the essential wisdom of the
fundamental trade-theoretic insight which illuminates this nexus: namely, labour standards
are ultimately a matter of domestic policy choice, and comparative advantage is enhanced
by diversity of standards, not by an artificial harmonization or “straitjacketing” of
countries into a particular country’s favoured standard. 
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